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Presented at the Dec. 10 2012
FTC/DOJ Workshop on PAEs,
with slide 24 added for context
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There are many ways to view patent assertion entities
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What is a patent assertion entity?

Justice Kennedy: “firms [that] use patents not
as a basis for producing and selling goods but,
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”
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What is a patent assertion entity?

FTC/Chien: an “entity that uses patents primarily
to obtain license fees rather than to support the
development or transfer of technology.”
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What is a patent assertion entity?

An entity that asserts patents on existing
products as a business model
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Asserting patents on existing products as a business
model distinguishes PAEs from other types of NPEs
Non-Practicing Entity Types
Universities
Non-Practicing
Defensive Aggregators
PAEs

(Non-Practicing
Corporate Monetizers)

Startups

Inventor
Monetizers

Special Purpose
Patent Monetizers
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Why is the PAE business model interesting?
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Traditional patent litigation economics are stacked
against enforcement
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Traditional patent litigation economics are stacked against
enforcement
Its Expensive to Bring a Patent Lawsuit

?
Direct Costs

Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement
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Traditional patent litigation economics are stacked against
enforcement
It’s Risky to Bring a Patent Lawsuit
Indirect Costs
Countersuit
Reputation
Disruption

?
Direct Costs

Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

COST

Judgment/
Settlement

>

REVENUE = LOSS
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These high costs and risks lead to the nonenforcement of
patents

~250K estimated
patents

?

Only a tiny
fraction is
enforced
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PAEs fundamentally change the economics of patent
enforcement
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PAEs don’t make anything and can’t be countersued,
disrupted, or impugned

Indirect Costs
Countersuit
Reputation
Disruption

?
Direct Costs

Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement
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PAEs don’t make anything and can’t be countersued,
disrupted, or impugned

Indirect Costs
Countersuit
Reputation
Disruption

?

X

Direct Costs

Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement

14

PAEs use contingent fee lawyers

?
Direct Costs

Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement
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PAEs use contingent fee lawyers

?
Direct Costs
Lawyers (75%)
Costs (25%)
Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement

16

PAEs use contingent fee lawyers and assert the same patents
in the same venues to capture economies of scale

?
Direct Costs
Lawyers (75%)
Costs (25%)
Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement
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PAEs make it economical to bring suit, and economical for the
defendant to settle, regardless of the merits

Nuisance
Fee Model
Settlement

?
Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement
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PAEs make it economical to bring suit, and economical for the
defendant to settle, regardless of the merits

Nuisance
Lottery
Fee Model

Settlement

?
Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement
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Don’t Call them Trolls
20

What is patent assertion?

What is patent assertion?
A pathbreaking, disruptive technology for
monetizing patents that eliminates traditional
obstacles to enforcement [and give the little guy
a chance!]
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What is patent assertion?

What is patent assertion?
A pathbreaking, legal disruptive technology for
monetizing patents that eliminates traditional
obstacles to enforcement

22

This year, PAEs have brought the majority (61%) of
patent lawsuits – 2,530 through December 1
PAE Suits as Share of Total Patent Infringement Suits
2544

1509

569

606

622

731

61%

731

45%
19%
2006

23%

25%

27%

29%

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012 - Dec 1

Source: RPX Research and PACER. Includes suits filed through 12/1/2012

Note to media: please do not report this slide without looking at the next one
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This slide added for context on Dec 11 and presented previously at Georgetown on November 2 –
shows that despite more PAE suits, the number of defendants has gone down. Both are likely due to
the AIA misjoinder rules – its harder to name more defendants per suit, requiring PAEs to split their
suits up and making it “not worth it” to sue smaller companies. We don’t know if total assertions are
net up or down, bc many demands are made for each suit (see slide 26).

The 61% of new suits
actually represents a
decline in the
number of
defendants named,
from a 2011 high.

19%

Source: RPX Research and PACER. Includes suits filed through 12/1/2012
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What is patent assertion?

What is patent assertion?
A pathbreaking, disruptive legal technology for
monetizing patents that eliminates traditional
obstacles to suit
That represents the majority of new patent cases
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For every lawsuit, many demands are made

How many demands are brought for every suit?
What is the Ratio of Demands to Suits?

25-50:1 – estimate of high end sell-side patent broker
307:1 – Cisco et al v. Innovatio, Case No. 1:11-cv-09308, Lex
Machina (8,000+ letters, 26 cases)
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We don’t know exactly what’s happening but it’s
Howthat….
many demands are brought for every suit?
likely
What is the Ratio of Demands to Suits?

25-50:1 – estimate of high end sell-side patent broker
307:1 – Cisco et al v. Innovatio, Case No. 1:11-cv-09308, Lex
Machina (8,000+ letters, 26 cases)

Most patent fights are
not conducted in public
27

Public cases and private demands are often resolved
under NDA
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What is patent assertion?

What is patent assertion?
A pathbreaking, disruptive legal technology for
monetizing patents that eliminates traditional
obstacles to suit
That represents the majority of new patent cases
About which we don’t really understand the
consequences, good or bad
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Now that we know what we are talking about

Now that we now what we are talking about…

No. It’s an elephant
30

This view

Now that we now what we are talking about…
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This view is empirical and descriptive, but motivated
Now
that
we
now
what
we
are
talking
about…
by policy concerns
Datasources
Literature,
Survey and Interview
Subjects

Open database of 100K+ startups and tech
companies
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RPX Data is on average within 1% vs. Lex Machina/Feldman
RPX Data vs. Lex Machina/Feldman 2012 Data
2012 coding for the GAO
60%

45%

On Average,
RPX = +1%

40%

40%

23%

25% 25%

30%
27%

29%
27%

RPX PAEs

22%

Lex Machina/
Feldman PMEs

20%

0%
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

See also RPX v. Chien 2009 (943 codings compared), reported in Chien 2012, Startups
and Patent Trolls (finding RPX = +4% PAEs)
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This Presentation

This Talk

1. Economics/Business Models of Patent
Assertion
2. Case Study: Harms/Benefits to Startups
3. Policy Issues
4. Monitoring/Research Agenda

34

This Presentation

This Talk

35

This Presentation

This Talk

1. Economics/Business Models of Patent
Assertion
2. Case Study: Harms/Benefits to Startups
3. Policy Issues
4. Monitoring/Research Agenda

36

PAEs capture economies of scale, over multiple defendants
and campaigns
Sample PAE Business Plan
Buy/Build
Asset

Secure
Financing/
Build Case

Revenue

Cost

Assertion
Campaign
1

Settlements

Cost of
Acquisition

Financing/
Legal Costs

Assertion
Campaign
2

Settlements

Assertion
Campaign . . . . .
3

Settlements

Marginal Cost of Assertion

The business model is risky – you may never get your investment back.
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PAEs capture economies of scale, over multiple defendants
and campaigns

?
Direct Costs

Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement
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The majority (76%) of PAE defendants are sued by a PAE that
has named 15+ defendants over 2 or more suits
Distribution of “Serial PAEs” by Defendants Named
(Jan 1, 2011 – Dec 1, 2012)
Non Repeat
Inventors
5%

Serial Inventors
3%
Non Repeat PAEs
19%

Serial PAEs
73%

Serial PAEs have named more than 15 defendants in more than 1 suit, Aggressive Repeating Inventors have named more than 15 defendants in
more than 1 suit
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Although suits against large tech companies get the most
attention, defendants revenue/industry profiles vary widely

$100M

3 Litigations/Year
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There are several drivers of settlement

Two Kinds of Hold-up
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Economic Value/Remedies-Driven Settlement

Remedies-Driven Holdup

“[When] the Sword of Damocles of a
jury verdict or [an] ITC injunction
hanging over their heads.”

?

Contingent Fee Lawyer Interviewee; David Schwartz,
The Rise of Contingent Fee Lawyer Representation in
Patent Law, __ Ala. Law Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2012)

See Shapiro and Lemley 2007

Settlement driven by how much it would cost to switch out
the technology (injunction) or what a court might award in
damages
42

Cost of Defense-Driven Settlement

Cost of Defense-Driven Holdup
When it’s cheaper to fold than fight

Chien 2012, Reforming Software Patents

Settlement driven by the cost of defense
43
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Why Startups Matter: from 2003-2007 they created more new
Why Startups Matter
jobs than other firms in the private sector

Credit: John Haltiwanger
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Startups create new jobs, but they also change course/fail at a
Why Startups Matter
high rate, shedding assets like patents

“Four out of every 10 hires at young
firms are for newly created
jobs, much higher than in older firms,
where the ratio fluctuates between 0.25
and 0.33”

Haltiwanger et. al, Job Creation, Worker Churning, and Wages
at Young Businesses (November 2012)
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How are PAEs benefiting small companies?

Why Startups Matter
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NPE/PAE buy and litigate the patents of small companies
How are startups benefiting from patent
($200M) more than the patents of others
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Some startups are interested in monetizing their patents
(although unclear if PAE v. ex ante transfer)
4% of 223 nonrandom survey respondents reported that
they had monetized their patents, with another 20%
saying that they had considered it.
Chien 2012, Startups & Patent Trolls
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How are PAEs harming small companies?

Why Startups Matter

50

The majority of PAE defendants (at least 55%) have less than
$10M in revenue

$10M
At least 55% of unique
defendants have less than
$10M in revenue and 66%
have less than $100M
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Why are small companies being sued?

Why are small companies being sued?
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The more funding a startup gets, the more likely it is to be
How often are tech startups sued?
sued.
% of Companies Sued (By Funds Raised)
60%

40%

20%

0%
0

$1-1M

$1M-5M

$5M-10M $10M-20M $20M-50M $50-500M

N= ~ 200 per category. Based on author analysis of ~1600 companies in Crunchbase
and Lex Machina litigation records.
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Some startups are harmed by PAE demands. More than a
nuisance.

Chien 2012, Startups & Patent Trolls
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We don’t really know the net benefits or costs
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Before PAEs: widespread nonenforcement of patents

~250K estimated
patents

?

Only a tiny
fraction is
enforced
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After PAEs: it can be economical to bring, and to settle suits,
regardless of the merits

Settlement

?
Cost of
Defense

Cost of
Assertion

Judgment/
Settlement
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What are the pros and cons of rapidly increasing
enforcement?
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Before PAEs: widespread nonenforcement of patents

~250K estimated
patents

?

Only a tiny
fraction is
enforced
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But widespread infringement has pro-competitive benefits

Patent is enforced

Patent is practiced, not enforced

I get to have the feature

We all get to have the feature,
in all different forms and prices.

Hooray for Competition!
62

When companies can’t win in the courtroom, they
must compete in the marketplace

Sources of Competitive Advantage
Courtroom

Marketplace

Freedom to litigate

Freedom to innovate

Great patents

Great products

Great lawyers

Great marketing
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But PAEs give the little guy a chance and create a demand for
How are startups benefiting from patent
their patents – this should increase innovation
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PAEs are increasing the velocity of transfers between buyers
How are startups benefiting from patent
and sellers of patent rights
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Repeat litigants dominate these transfers. 61% of
defendants were sued by a PAE who had sued 8+ times.
PAE Plaintiff Type by Number of Defendants Named: Jan 1, 2011 – Dec 1, 2012
Non Repeat
Inventors
23%

Repeat Litigant (8+
lawsuits) PAEs
60%

Repeat Litigant (8+
lawsuits) Inventors
1%

Non Repeat PAEs
16%

Repeat Litigant PAEs have named more than 15 defendants in more than 7 suit, Aggressive Repeating Inventors have named more than 15
defendants in more than 7 suit
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Allison et al 2011 found that the most asserted software
patents (8+ cases) – lose in court roughly 90% of the time
PAE Plaintiff Type by Number of Defendants Named: Jan 1, 2011 – Dec 1, 2012
Non Repeat
Inventors
23%

Are these transfers
Repeat Litigant (8+legitimate?
lawsuits) PAEs
60%

Repeat Litigant (8+
lawsuits) Inventors
1%

Non Repeat PAEs
16%

Repeat Litigant PAEs have named more than 15 defendants in more than 7 suit, Aggressive Repeating Inventors have named more than 15
defendants in more than 7 suit
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How efficient are the transfers between buyers and sellers of
technology? (survey data)
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Based on 900 litigations, in the majority of them, the
legal costs exceed the settlement
90%

10%

4%

31%
47%

53%
87%

Settlement or
judgment cost

13%

Legal cost

96%
69%
53%

$0-10K

$10K-100K

$100K-1M

47%

$1M-10M

$10M+

Total defendant cost to resolve matter
(legal + settlement/judgment)
RPX Survey of 78 companies with 900 resolved NPE litigations. Legal cost includes outside counsel (lead, local, and re-exam), experts,
discovery, prior art searching, jury consultants, graphics, and other related costs. Excludes in-house legal costs. Settlement and judgment costs
may include the estimated present value of running royalties. NPEs include PAEs (Patent assertion entities believed to earn revenue
predominantly through licensing of patents), universities and research institutions, individual inventors, and select operating companies asserting
patents well outside their area of product or services. The very vast majority of the data underlying this analysis reflects litigation with PAEs.
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What reforms are possible?
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Non-ITC Judicial remedies reforms have reduced the
Remedies-Driven Holdup
injunction rate and made proving damages more expensive

Uniloc,
LaserDynamics,
Lucent
Posner

Ebay and its Progeny
Causal Nexus
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Other reforms are aimed at reducing the cost of defense and
Remedies-Driven Holdup
increasing the cost of assertion
Post Grant Review
e-Discovery Reform

Misjoinder Rules
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One-way fee shifting could dramatically change courtoom
economics and contingent representation
Fee-Shifting

But the past has shown it to be less
useful against:
- Repeat players (but most PAEs are)
- Judgment proof parties (but many
PAEs are)
- Cases that don’t go to judgment (only
5% of cases do)
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Also, need to worry about presuit dynamic

How many demands are brought for every suit?
What is the Ratio of Demands to Suits?

25-50:1 – estimate of high end sell-side patent broker
307:1 – Cisco et al v. Innovatio, Case No. 1:11-cv-09308, Lex
Machina (8,000+ letters, 26 cases)
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What about market-based ways of reducing the cost of
defense?
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What about market-based ways of reducing the cost of
defense?

Group Defense
Non-Settlement Policy
Insurance
Defense Contigency
Self-Help
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What about market-based ways of reducing the cost of
defense?

Group Defense
Non-Settlement Policy
Insurance
Defense Contigency
Self-Help
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These approaches have been used before

How many demands are brought for every suit?
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In the late 1880s, railroads, under patent attack in a manner similar to tech
companies today formed Associations that mounted…

How many demands are brought for every suit?

Steve Usselman, Patents Purloined 1991
See also Chien, Reforming Software Patents 2012
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It worked! (combine and overcome v. divide and conquer)

How many demands are brought for every suit?

Steve Usselman, Patents Purloined 1991
See also Chien, Reforming Software Patents 2012
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The competition authorities had a role

How many demands are brought for every suit?
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So, where does that leave us?

How many demands are brought for every suit?
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4. Monitoring/Research Agenda

“To understand
God's thoughts we
must study
statistics”

-Florence
Nightingale
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More research is needed to understand the positive
and negative impacts

What have small companies done with the money?
(What cut did they get?)
What is the nature of the negative impacts?

What has been the impact on innovation
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Qualitative, quantitative, and historical approaches could all be
Research/Monitoring Agenda
useful

“Everything that can
be counted does not
necessarily count;
everything that
counts cannot
necessarily be
counted.”
Comprehensive Case Studies
Monitor movements in the market
See if legal/market reforms work
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